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KIVY AND LANGER ON EXPRESSIVENESS  IN MUSIC
Abstract:  From 1980 onwards, Peter Kivy has put forward that music does not so much 
express emotions but rather is expressive of emotions. The character of the music does not 
represent the character or mood of the composer, but refl ects his knowledge of emotional life. 
Unfortunately, Kivy fails to give credit to Susanne Langer, who brought these views to the fore 
as early as 1942, claiming that the vitality of music lies in expressiveness, not in expression.
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During the second half of the twentieth century the question as to 
whether, and to what extent, music is capable of expressing something as 
quintessentially human as emotion has exercised many authors on the phi-
losophy of music. Measured against the volume of paper printed with texts 
that in one way or another treat this question, the return is rather poor. Many of 
these authors apply the methods of analytical philosophy, which is to say that 
a plethora of ad hoc conceptual distinctions is generated, which at fi rst sight 
seem closely reasoned, but in the end have little to add to a better understand-
ing of the expressive qualities of music.
Peter Kivy’s Saint Bernard
An author who, over recent decades, has taken centre stage in this 
debate is Peter Kivy. Kivy, to his merit, displays a much greater understanding 
of the history of the question of musical expressivity than many other Anglo-
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Saxon authors do. Yet even he seems to feel the need to claim a unique 
position in the literature and to magnify the distinctions between himself and 
other authors.
 Kivy has long been engaged with the philosophy of music. His fi rst 
work, The Corded Shell (Kivy 1980)1, became an immediate bestseller. Amidst 
his many other books, the Introduction to a Philosophy of Music (Kivy 2002) 
stands out as an excellent guide to get acquainted with the fi eld. The illustration 
that starts off The Corded Shell is rather unusual for a work on the aesthetics 
of music: sitting on a wooden fl oor a Saint Bernard looks out at us giving the 
distinct impression that it is feeling uneasy with being the eye-catcher of the 
book. The caption of the photo reads: “The Saint Bernard Has a Sad Face”.
 Yet, the dog’s expression and its description in the caption give a clue 
as to what Kivy wants to make clear about the expressive properties of music; 
one might even say that this fi rst illustration sums up what Kivy will go on to 
put forward concerning the aesthetics of music, even if his writing becomes 
much more differentiated and nuanced. What would the doggy have looked 
like if it had been fully aware of its glorious position as the visual opening 
statement of an introduction into the aesthetics of music? The answer can only 
be: exactly the same. And the caption would still read: “The Saint Bernard 
Has a Sad Face”.
 We are faced with a paradox: when we feel that somebody is looking 
a little sorry, we tend to assume that s/he will be feeling unhappy. A failed 
exam, unlucky in love, a bad night’s sleep, anything might have caused 
someone to look dejected to our eyes. Yet when we take the melancholy that 
we see in the Saint Bernard’s face to be an expression of the animal’s state of 
mind, we make an error: this is just the way the dog always looks.
Physiological as opposed to cognitive points of view
Kivy has no diffi culty in detecting parallel errors in descriptions of 
the character of a piece of music. As in the case of Donald Tovey, author of 
the well-known Essays in Musical Analysis, when he describes the music of 
1  The complete text of this book is included in his later Sound Sentiment – An Essay on the 
Musical Emotions, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
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the second part of Beethoven’s Eroica as “utterly broken with grief”. If that 
be the case, an empathetic Kivy suggests: “Shouldn’t we try to cheer the poor 
thing up?” (Kivy 1980:  6)
 It is a striking introduction to the basic distinction which informs 
Kivy’s theory of musical expression. As is to be expected from an analytic 
philosopher, he fi nds the solution of the above-mentioned paradox in a 
linguistic distinction. When we say: “The Saint Bernard Has a Sad Face”, 
we do not mean to say: “The Saint Bernard’s face expresses sadness”; we 
mean to say: “The Saint Bernard’s face is expressive of sadness” (1980: 12). 
What is the difference between the two? The dog’s face looks sad, without the 
dog having to feel sad. The impression the dog’s face makes on us has been 
abstracted from the emotion that can be taken as the cause of an expression of 
sadness. In other words: there is a species of expressiveness which should not 
be taken to be a representation of a truly experienced emotion.
 With this move Kivy turns against a venerable tradition in the history 
of Western music. In the Romantic era, the composer was taken to express 
his deepest personal feelings in music. But even earlier, in the writings of the 
Baroque era and of Empfi ndsamkeit, many an example can be found of views 
on the expressiveness of music in which no distinction is made between a 
musician who is cheerful, and music which sounds cheerful. As in for instance 
the well-known passage in Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach’s Versuch über die 
wahre Art das Klavier zu spielen [Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard 
Instruments] from 1753: 
“A musician cannot move others unless he too is moved. He must of necessity 
feel all of the affects that he hopes to arouse in his audience, for the revealing 
of his own humor will stimulate a like humor in the listener. In languishing, 
sad passages, the performer must languish and grow sad. (…) Similarly, 
in lively, joyous passages, the executant must again put himself into the 
appropriate mood. And so, constantly varying the passions he will barely 
quiet one before he rouses another. Above all, he must discharge this offi ce in 
a piece which is highly expressive by nature, whether it be by him or someone 
else. In the latter case he must make certain that he assumes the emotion 
which the composer intended in writing it.” (Bach 1949: 152).
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 Here music is taken to be a kind of infectious disease, and in the 
context of eighteenth century thinking about emotions, this is less of an 
anomaly than it seems today. Events happening in the world could well have 
a direct impact on our physical constitution, while emotions were thought to 
be under the infl uence of the humours or of the animal spirits, that, according 
to Descartes, liaised between the mind and the body. In treatises such as 
Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Kapellmeister (1739) we fi nd an application 
of this way of thinking to music. Yet, according to Kivy, Mattheson takes a 
giant leap forward as he takes the correlation between the movements of the 
animal spirits and the character of the music not to be a mechanical one. What 
is refl ected in the music is, rather, the composer’s knowledge of emotions, 
which does not require the listener to be infected with the emotions that the 
composer expresses in his music.
 In the philosophy of music of the twentieth century, the old-fashioned 
“physiological” views on how music works have been almost entirely replaced 
with the “cognitive” views which Kivy believes are to be found in Mattheson’s 
work for the very fi rst time – and to which he wholeheartedly subscribes. Many 
words and even works have been devoted by Kivy to convince us of a point that, 
perhaps, can not be expected to accord to the intuitions of all and every music 
listener, yet is not so terribly convoluted that it takes a retraining of the mind to 
work it out. I often feel that minor differences in approach with other philoso-
phers are blown up out of proportion in order to justify the ocean of ink.
Symbolic transformation
 To illustrate this with one striking example, I will now turn to what 
Kivy himself thinks sets him apart from Susanne K. Langer (1895–1985). 
Langer shared an avid interest in and sympathy for Wittgenstein and his 
conceptual precision with many other American philosophers. Yet she never, 
unlike many of her compatriots of later generations, let herself be trapped by 
the analytical tradition.
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 Her best-known book, Philosophy in a New Key (Langer 1978)2, is 
devoted entirely to symbolism – in language, in ritual, in myth and in the 
arts. Not in the sense that existing symbols were to be translated into their 
meanings; her interest was focused on the ways in which symbolism works. 
With that question in mind, she devoted an entire chapter to signifi cance 
in music. This chapter is often read out of context. Commentaries on it 
often fail to mention that Langer’s text should be read in the context of her 
refl ections on the functioning of the human mind, and not as a contribution 
to the aesthetics of music. The human mind is set apart by an activity which 
Langer, following her European forebear Ernst Cassirer, characterizes as 
symbolic transformation: impulses that permeate into our consciousness are 
transferred to a different domain of signifi cation. This constitutes a cognitive 
act, of which we need not necessarily be conscious. When listening to music 
we recognize in an insistent, yet conceptually inaccessible way something 
about the structure of our emotions: “music articulates forms which language 
cannot set forth” (Langer 1978: 233). 
How does Kivy set his views on the expressive character of music 
against Langer’s? From the very fi rst time he mentions her name in The Corded 
Shell (1980: 34), he attempts to steer clear of her. Kivy refers to Langer when 
she remarks that the physical effects of music affect the unmusical listener in 
the same way that they do the musical listener – from which she concludes 
that these effects have more to do with sound than with music (or, as I would 
reformulate it, they are the effects of hearing music rather than listening to 
it). Kivy condemns this view: if the engendering of emotions is an effect of 
sound and not of music, then Langer must be suffering from the preconception 
that music cannot arouse emotions. However, when we read Langer in her 
own context, we fi nd that she is not so much talking about the arousing of 
emotions, but about primary somatic changes in heartbeat and breathing 
patterns. She writes that these are more easily infl uenced by sound than by 
music, and she adds that the sounds used in psychological experiments are 
2  Although only one chapter of the book deals with music, there is a musical allusion in the title: 
the word “key” also means “tonality”. The “new key” referred to is symbolism.
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irritating rather than inspiring (Langer 1978: 212). When we return to Kivy, 
we fi nd that his quoting of Langer is preceded by a remark about a baby who 
burst into tears at the sound of a trumpet. That the poor child is frightened 
to death by the noise is to be expected, according to Kivy, and has nothing 
to do with any connotation one might associate with trumpet music. In what 
way exactly does this remark differ from Langer’s observations on primary 
physical reactions being due to sound rather than to music?
 We encounter another attempt to put Langer down on the question of 
the historical role of Schopenhauer. Langer has adopted Schopenhauer as one 
of her chief inspirations. In her view Schopenhauer has recognised a form of 
emotive symbolism in music, which does not result from the emotional state in 
which the musician fi nds himself (as many of Schopenhauer’s contemporaries 
still believed). Here too Langer’s views are in accordance with Kivy’s: music 
has to do with audible emotionality, to which the listener is responsive. How-
ever, this is not the expression of a person’s state of mind. Kivy responds to 
Langer’s declaration of support for Schopenhauer by taking a swipe at her: he 
believes that the German philosopher “does not point forward to the semantic 
theory of Langer so much as backward to the resemblance theory of Mattheson 
(by which I mean to pay him a compliment)” (Kivy 1980: 44). 
Emotions and conventions
The two aspects that seem to annoy Kivy most, and which in his later 
works re-emerge as reproofs of Langer’s work, touch on the core of the theory. 
The fi rst aspect concerns the nature of the relationship of meaning between 
music and emotionality. Langer refers to this relationship as being symbolic, 
in a sense of that term which she has fi rst carefully distinguished from the 
discursive symbolism which we meet in the realm of language. The syntax 
and semantics of language are not open to willy-nilly manipulation: we can 
look up what a word means in a dictionary, but the fact that the word has 
this specifi c meaning cannot be deduced from the form of the word itself. In 
music it is the other way round: the “meaning” of chords and phrases cannot 
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be looked up in a glossary. If music nevertheless does have meaning, then this 
has to be ascribed precisely to its forms: musical structures resemble outer-
musical ones, those of our emotions in particular. Langer approvingly quotes 
psychologist of music Carroll Pratt who claims that the auditory characters 
of music “are not emotions at all. They merely sound the way moods feel…” 
(Langer 1978: 244, 245). There is a certain formal analogy, an isomorphism, 
between the two, and when a relationship of meaning is realised in this way, 
then Langer speaks of presentational symbolism, as opposed to the discursive 
symbolism of language. 
 Kivy does not approve. Even if he too recognises a resemblance be-
tween music and the emotions, he denies that the isomorphism Langer speaks 
of is suffi cient to claim a symbolic relationship between music and emotion. 
Music should also refer the listener to these emotions. In other words, there 
must be a convention of meaning before it can be said to be a symbol: “(f)or 
even iconic, ‘look-like’ symbols must ‘mean’ by convention” (Kivy 2002: 30). 
Which does not apply to music.
 The diffi culty here is that Kivy’s argument rests on a restriction that, in 
the wake of Charles S. Peirce, has become attached to the concept of “symbol” 
in Anglo-American semiotics. This restriction entails that the concept of 
symbol is used only for the kind of signs that lack a natural relationship with 
what they signify, and rely on convention (such as a designation) or agreement 
(such as a right-of-way sign). The concept of symbol is certainly one of the 
most diffi cult to apply unambiguously, but at this point Kivy should have 
realised that symbolism (and not music) is the new key to which Langer’s book 
is dedicated. On coming to Chapter VIII, the reader has become acquainted 
with Langer’s use of the concept of symbol in the tradition of Cassirer. In 
her previous chapter, symbolism in mythology is discussed; the reader has 
become familiar with just about the strongest symbol which mythology can 
offer: the moon as a symbol for femininity. Long before Wittgenstein came 
up with his picture theory, long before Peirce decided that a symbol must not 
have a natural relationship to whatever it symbolises, even long before anyone 
had learned to read or write, people had noticed that both the moon and the 
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human female had a 28 days cycle. Therefore, “moon = woman”, whatever 
the exact nature of the copula may be. That is what old-fashioned philosophers 
like Cassirer and Langer (or Freud, for that matter) refer to as a symbol. Would 
Kivy really mean that this requires an explicit “convention of meaning”? The 
strength of Langer’s contribution to the understanding of the capacities of 
music lies exactly in that she shows that music, in so far as signifi cance can 
be ascribed to it, works implicitly, as in mythology, and not explicitly, as in 
language.
 A second reproof Kivy repeats time and again ultimately refers again 
to this difference between implicit and explicit acquisition of signifi cance. Kivy 
presents his own theory of expressiveness as a conception in which music relates 
to the garden-variety of individual emotions, whereas, in his representation of 
Langer’s position, she relates music to emotionality in general. According to 
him, Langer denies any possibility of music being expressive of individual 
emotions (Kivy 1980: 46). But where does he get this idea from? It is true that 
Langer does not elaborate on the various emotions that can be related to music; 
it is also true that she emphasizes that music cannot distinguish between the 
various emotions in the way language can, and it is even true that she points out 
that some musical forms allow both a sad and a happy interpretation. But she 
distances herself from a conception (defended by Hauptmann and Carrière) in 
which music “conveys general forms of feeling”: however much she admires 
the insights into the cognitive value of music that it expresses, she considers 
this conception to be too abstract to do justice to the emotional values and the 
vitality that characterise each piece of music.
 Langer does not deny that music relates to individual emotions; what 
she does deny is that they relate to the emotions of the individual. A short 
quote, in which she aligns herself to the insights Schopenhauer and Wagner 
brought to the question:
 “Feelings revealed in music are essentially not ‘the passion, love or longing of 
such-and-such an individual’, inviting us to put ourselves into that individual’s 
place, but are represented to our understanding ...” (Langer 1978: 222). 
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Langer’s theory, formulated in an era when romantic conceptions of 
expression reigned supreme, is a classic example of the cognitive conception 
that Kivy pursues: “(n)ot communication but insight is the gift of music; in 
very naïve phrase, a knowledge of ‘how feelings go’.” (1980: 244).
 In conclusion: of all Anglo-Saxon philosophers of music seeking the 
limelight today, Kivy is the most informative and the most readable. Anyone 
who wants an introduction into this fi eld will fi nd him an invaluable guide. 
Of Langer however, he draws a caricature; he fails to inform his readers that 
Langer presents music as a form of implicit symbolism, enabling us to sense 
emotions not in it, but through it: “Articulation is its life, but not assertion; 
expressiveness, not expression” (Langer 1978: 240). I’m afraid I can’t escape 
the conclusion that Kivy, in spite of his recognition of her pioneering role in 
the question of music’s relation to the emotions (Kivy 2002: 27), fi nds it hard 
to accept that Langer preceded his Saint Bernard by almost half a century.
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Алберт ван дер Схоут
КИВИ И ЛАНГЕРОВА О ЕКСПРЕСИВНОСТИ МУЗИКЕ
(Резиме)
Старо питање да ли музика може да изражава емоције заузело 
је централно место у филозофији музике након Другог светског рата, 
посебно у САД. Наиме, још се од барокног доба веровало да музика 
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може да изражава и изазива емоције (нпр. Драјден /Dryden/): „Коју то 
страст музика не може да подстакне и угуши”!). Током XX века гледишта 
се мењају. Музика се више не посматра као посредник физиолошког 
искуства емоција, већ као њихов симбол. Идеја подстицања (arousal) 
замењена је идејом препознавања. Дебата се шири – симболизација или 
репрезентација? – а поједини њени учесници траже строге и прецизне 
критеријуме за избор појма којим би се описао семиотички однос 
између музике и емоција. Ипак, чини се да недостаје јасна веза између 
тог избора и њихових погледа на значај музике. Стиче се утисак да је 
расправа о музици на известан начин увучена у актуелну филозофску 
дебату, посебно у области аналитичке филозофије. 
Један од најзначајнијих аутора на овом пољу је Питер Киви 
(Kivy). Од 1980. године он у својим радовима подржава прелазак са 
теорије подстицања на когнитивну теорију. Ипак, често критикује Сузану 
Лангер (Langer), која је на веома инспиративан начин указала на потребу 
за таквим преласком још 1942. године у својој студији Филозофија у 
новом кључу (Philosophy in a New Key). Чему онда критике? Да ли Киви не 
жели да призна да је Лангерова пола века пре њега дефинисала поменути 
прелазак? На основу начина на који он упућује/не упућује на гледишта 
Лангерове, тешко је избећи овакав закључак. 
